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Abstract -
 
Message passing from one source to another has
 
become a key for many upcoming 
technologies. This is
 
already achieved by introduction of topics of KEYS,
 
AUTHENTICATIONS etc. 
Secret key transfer is being done
 
presently by using mutually trusted key generation centre
 
(KGS). By 
this selection of session key by which encryption is
 
done for information passing is selected. This 
paper discusses
 
about the advancement of this technology by extending this
 
service to group 
instead of a single key. The whole group with
 
authenticated
 
users can access the information. The 
proposed protocol considers the heterogeneity of the peer resources as
 
QOS factor in key 
generation phase and shared key
 
mechanism as primary process to achieve security in group key 
sharing.
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Abstract - Message passing from one source to another has 
become a key for many upcoming technologies. This is 
already achieved by introduction of topics of KEYS, 
AUTHENTICATIONS etc. Secret key transfer is being done 
presently by using mutually trusted key generation centre 
(KGS). By this selection of session key by which encryption is 
done for information passing is selected. This paper discusses 
about the advancement of this technology by extending this 
service to group instead of a single key. The whole group with 
authenticated users can access the information. The proposed 
protocol considers the heterogeneity of the peer resources as 
QOS factor in key generation phase and shared key 
mechanism as primary process to achieve security in group 
key sharing. 
Keywords : GKMP, GKTP, P2P, Group key, QoS, 
Security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
very message under transformation ought to have 
security provided to it. So, for providing high 
security, we consider 2 issues namely (1) 
Message Confidentiality: Only the authenticated and 
intended user should read the message and (2) 
Message Authentication: The receiver should be 
assured that the sent message is from authenticated 
sender and the message is not altered in the middle. 
Here the work of KGS starts. It should provide a 
one-time session key to achieve the above 2 issues of 
key exchange. So, KGS distributes the secret key to all 
intended users with confidentiality and authentication. 
We can see from [5] the 2 types of key establishment 
protocols namely Key transfer protocols, Key agreement 
protocols. 
Apart from this the KGS helps in selecting the 
secret key and transport them to all communication 
entities secretly. These session keys are determined by 
all communication entities where the most commonly 
used is Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement protocol 
[12]. 
Public keys of the communication entities play a 
key role in this protocol. They are exchanged to fix the 
value of session key. As the public key itself does not 
provide authentication, uses a digital signature. But the 
only drawback is that this is on whole applicable only 
two 2 users but not to a group. The importance of group 
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key is found here as everyone ought to have it. This 
group key management protocol can be of 2 categories. 
Centralize group key management protocols, where the 
whole group is managed by a Group Key generation. 
Distributed group key management, where each 
individual manages the generation of key rather than a 
group key distribution. Of the both key management 
protocols, we use Centralized group key management 
the most. It was proposed by Harney et al[15] which 
takes O(n) where n indicates the size of group 
participating in the generation of key id. In addition to 
this, to update this group key either adding or editing 
the users, we have hierarchical structure based group 
key protocols [10],[22],[27]. 
II. RELATED WORK 
We have Fiat and Naor[14]  introducing a k-
resistant protocol. Using this security to about k users is 
provided with O(k log k log n) keys and server 
broadcasting O(k2
 
log2
 
k log n) messages per rekeying. 
EBS (Exclusion Basis System) proposed by Eltoweissy 
et al.[13] is a combinatorial formulation which helps 
users to switch between number of keys needed to be
 
stored and number of messages to be transmitted. All 
this is for key updating so that solution to collusion is 
provided.
 
In the previous days, this group generation 
management protocols involved the naturally 
generalized DH key agreement protocol. Many 
examples can be quoted like Ingemarsson et al. [18], 
Steer et al. [28], Burmester and Desmedt [9],and Steiner 
et al. [29] . Later, in 1990s, Steiner et al[29] came 
forward with extension of DH naming it as DH key 
exchange[29] and in 2001, name was changed to
 
authentication services[6].
 
Later from 2006, there was a drastic 
advancement in this group key generations. In the very 
year of 2006, Bohli[8] proposed a framework for group 
key generation agreement which is intended to provide 
security opposing harming participators and active 
unauthenticated users at every point in the network. In 
2007, Katz and Yung [19] proposed the first constant-
round and fully scalable group DH protocol which is 
provably secure in the standard model. Above all, the 
key feature of group DH is to generate a secret group 
key by a standardised group like KGS other than relying 
on members inside.
 
E 
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The next advancement in providing security is 
identifying the intruders present inside the network. For 
that, Tzeng [31] provided a conference key agreement 
protocol with the assistance of discrete logarithm (DL). 
Each user in the group requires having nm power 
polynomials with n representing number of participants. 
Later,. in 2008, Cheng and Lain [11] modified Tseng‟s 
conference key agreement protocol based on bilinear 
pairing. In2009, Huang et al. [16] proposed a no 
interactive protocol based on DL assumption to improve 
the efficiency of Tseng‟s protocol. 
All the proposals made and developed till now 
are good. But one main problem is the time constraint. 
Since this key agreement involves all the communication 
entities, takes a lot of time for decision. So to reduce 
this, we have 2 different solutions. (1)All the 
communication entities assuming that there is an offline 
server active all the time and decides the secret key with 
this assumption.[4],[14],[25,][3]. (2) All the 
communication entities assuming that an online server 
is in active state. 
Of the two, the 1st
 
one is called key 
redistribution scheme. In this schema, offline users are 
provided with a secret piece of information created by a 
trusted group .But the backhand of this approach is that 
every server has to store a lot of secret keys and 
information. So we came to the 2nd
 
approach [20] . It‟s 
working is almost similar to IEEE 802.11i standard [17] . 
Here, an online server votes for a group key and 
transmits to every group member.
 
Even though they employ same methodology, 
there is a slight difference. Instead of encrypt in the 
group temporal key(GTK) by Key encryption key(KEK) 
and individually saying the secret key information to 
each user, here in this approach, the information of 
group key is also said to all user so that they can 
calculate their own secret keys. Lain et.al [20] in 1989 
was the 1st
 
to come up with an algorithm in this 
approach making use of (t, n) .It consists of (k-1) 
members. We can also provide some papers in 
[2],[21],[25] with the same principle.
Coming to our paper, we are able to make a 
solution to this problem by providing confidentiality and 
authentication. We also
 
came forward separating the 
insider and outsider attacks.
 
To achieve all the above, every user should 
have an account in KGS to access the group key 
transfer service and in turn to achieve a secret key. So, 
for all these transformations, we need a secret channel 
for message passing to all the communication entities. 
And also to transfer this selected group key, to all 
insiders of network, we need a separate and secret 
channel. This group key is confidential and no 
mathematical calculations are involved here but it is 
information theoretically secure.
 
 
III. OBJECTIVE 
Having a look at its background, we should be 
acquainted with: Choose two large primes p  and 
q and calculate a public n such that *n p q , which 
can be referred as quandary of factoring. 
Practically resolving the quandary of factoring is 
difficult. Even though Blakely [1] and Shamir [26] 
developed a solution for this, it is not so efficient. 
According to this scheme, a whole secret key is shared 
among all the communication entities so that each gets 
a share of t . With more or equal to t shares each can 
calculate their secret keys. But with less than t , 
computation is not possible. This is called 
( , )t n scheme. It in turn consists of 2 algorithms: 
a) Share Generation Algorithm:  
Dealer D first picks a polynomial f(x) of degree 
(t-1) randomly: 
1
0 1 1( ) ,..... ,
t
tf x a a x a x

    in which 
the secret 0 (0)S a f  and all coefficients 
0, 1,..... 1xa a a   are in a finite field ( )pIF GF p  with p 
elements.  
D calculates all shares: ( )(mod )i pS f i  for 
1,......i n  Then,  
D calculates a list of n shares 2( , ,...... )i nS S S and 
distributes each share iS  to corresponding shareholder 
iP  privately. 
b) Secret Reconstruction Algorithm: 
This algorithm takes any shares 
1
( ,.... )
ti i
S S  as 
input, it can reconstruct the secret s as 
(0) i i
i A
S f S 

   
{ }
( )(mod ),ji
i A j A i j i
x
S p
x x   
 
 
 
1{ ,.... } {1,2,...... },tA i i n 
 
i
 for i A  are 
Lagrange coefficients. This scheme is able to satisfy all 
the security related issues like  
a) Able to calculate the secret key only if t or more than 
t shares are known.  
b) If not more than t shares are known, it is not able to 
calculate the secret key.  
c) Also follows the Shamir‟s scheme that there are no 
numerical calculations and all are assume base on 
the above expressions. 
After all this a modular inverse is to be 
calculated for secret reconstruction process. It is 
discussed in Euclid algorithm [30]. 
Coming to objectives the proposed protocol is 
distributed key generation under the consideration of 
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peer resource heterogeneity and security. In proposed 
protocol model, KGS undertakes the selection of 
optimized peers to participate in key generation and 
authenticates the peer integrity and eligibility to become 
part of the peer network by receiving group key. At the 
outset every member should register to the KGS which 
intern at registration selects peers with optimal 
resources to participate in key generation and provides 
those selected peers a confidential matter by which 
calculation of secret key is done and authenticity state of 
the every peer expecting to be part of the network. Then 
the selected peers generates group key and for each 
correct and authorised peer to receive group key, a 
checksum is appended with cipher text. All around the 
encryption algorithm provides this security. The 
confidentiality is achieved by secret sharing scheme 
proposed. For security, a general broadcast message is 
created and sent to all communication entities where its 
secrecy is maintained theoretically. 
Considering heterogeneity of the peer 
resources in key generation and security is the key 
factor in our paper. So the primary goal is to provide 
security. Some important goals formulated are: 
Selecting peers for key generation: Selecting 
peers that are optimized in terms of having resources to 
participate in key generation.  
Fixing the key generation peer group count : 
The proposed protocol selects set of peers such that all 
other peers can receive group key from selected peer in 
hop level. 
Key freshness : That is, the key should not be 
used before so that further problems may not arise. 
Key Confidentiality : It is the assurance that the 
secret information is accessed only by authorized group 
members. 
Key authentication : Providing authentication 
guarantees that generation and broadcasting of secret 
group key is done by KGS, a trusted organisation but 
not by any hackers. 
In spite of all these QoS and security issues, we 
have 2 more threats to be worked on  
a) Any hacker in person using the authenticated group 
user for his works done. 
b) Hackers modifying the messages in their way of 
transfer even before reaching the destination esp. 
KGS. 
IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
To overcome these, the proposed protocol has 
3 remedial measures. 
a) Initialization of KGS. 
b) User registration 
c) Selecting optimal peers for Group key generation 
d) Group key generation and distribution. 
Initialization of KGS
 
: In this primary step, KGS 
chooses optimal peers to participate in group key 
generation. Then KGC sends all random primes 
selected as shared checksums of the optimal peers to 
all peers participating in key generation. Then the peers 
selected for key generation compute n
 
from shared 
checksums sent by KGC. This n is made public as 
stated in the proposed theory above in this paper.
 
User Registration: Immediately after the KGS is 
initialized, it is ready to use and encourages the user 
registrations. It in turn keeps track of all the registered 
users and alerts optimal peers about unauthorised 
peers.
 
Optimal peer selection for key generation
 
: 
Since the heterogeneity of the peer computational 
resources has taken into consideration, our proposed 
model selects the optimal peers with eligible 
computational resource for group key generation.
 
Group key generation and distribution
 
: As the 
registration phase ends with the user requests to the 
KGS for authentication, it sends the shared checksums 
of the optimal peers to all optimal peers along with the 
credentials of eligible peers to optimal peers selected 
for group key generation. Then optimal peers randomly 
select the secret key t of the hop level requested user 
and send him the message which is unique to him. By 
this he can access the group key. 
 
All this transformations between the KGS and users is 
fallows.
 
Step 1:
 
KGS receives certificates and about 
computational resources from Group members to 
initiate the key generation.
 
Step 2
 
:
 
As the authentication, KGS responses 
by sending the broadcast messages to selected peers 
that are optimal in resources to participate in key 
generation.
 
Step3
 
:
 
As a note of agreement, optimal peers
 
send a random challenge 
*
i nR  to KGS.
 
Step 4
 
:
 
KGS sends all random challenges as 
shared checksums of optimal nodes to all optimal 
nodes. 
 
Then optimal nodes generates group key k
 
from these shared checksums received from GKS, and 
generates an interpolated polynomial ( )f x with degree 
't to pass through ( 1)t  points, (0, )k and 
( , )i i ix y R , for 1,2,3,.... 'i t . Optimal nodes also 
compute t
 
additional points, iOP
 
for 
1,2,3,.... 'i t ,on ( )f x and 
1 2 3 '( , , , ,.... )tauth h k OP OP OP OP , where h is a one-
way hash function and 1 2 3 ', , ,.... tOP OP OP OP
 
are 
optimal peers. Then optimal peers send ( , )iauth OP , 
for 1,...., 'i t .
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Step 5: Every group member, iP , after knowing 
the shared secret, ( , )i i ix y R , and  other optimal 
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 V.
 
RESULTS ANALYSIS
 
The experiments were conducted by developing 
simulation model using MXML. We build a simulation 
network with hops count of 80. The simulation 
parameters described in table 1.  Authentication ensures 
that the buffer is properly allocated to valid packets.  
The simulation model aimed to compare “Authenticated 
Group Key Transfer Protocol Based on Secret Sharing” 
and proposed HTAGKTP. The performance check of 
these two protocols carried out against to the threats 
listed below. 
 

 
Rushing attack
 

 
Denial of service
 

 
Tunnelling
 

 
The protection against tunnelling attack is the 
advantage of the HTAGKTP over AGKTP[32].
 Number of nodes Range
 
80
 
Dimensions of space
 
1500 m × 300 m
 
Nominal radio range
 
250 m
 
Source–destination pairs
 
20
 
Source data pattern (each)
 
4 packets/second
 
Application data payload size
 
512 bytes/packet
 
Total application data load range
 
128 to 512 kbps
 
Raw physical link bandwidth
 
2 Mbps
 
Initial ROUTE REQUEST timeout
 
2 seconds
 
Maximum ROUTE REQUEST 
timeout
 
40 seconds
 Cache size
 
32 routes
 
Cache replacement policy
 
FIFO
 
Hash length
 
80 bits
 
certificate life time
 
2 sec
 
Table1:
 
Simulation parameters that we considered for 
experiments
 
Proposed 
protocols 
Routing 
strategy 
Protects 
from 
Rushing 
attack 
Protects 
from 
Denial of 
service 
Protects 
from Routing 
table 
modification 
Protects 
from 
Tunneling 
AGKTP[32]
 
P2p
 
Yes
 
Yes
 
No
 
No
 
HTAGKTP P2p Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 2 : Protocols and their ability to handle different attacks 
 The metrics to verify the performance of the 
proposed protocol are
 

 
Data packet delivery ratio
 
: It can be calculated as 
the ratio between the number of data packets that 
are sent by the source and the number of data 
packets that are received by the sink.
 

 
Packet Delivery Fraction: It is the ratio of data 
packets delivered to the destinations to those 
generated by the sources. The PDF tells about the 
performance of a protocol that how successfully the 
packets have been delivered. Higher the value gives 
the better results.
 

 
Average End To End Delay
 
: Average end-to-end 
delay is an average end-to-end delay of data 
packets. Buffering during route discovery latency, 
queuing at interface queue, retransmission delays at 
the MAC and transfer times, may cause this delay. 
Once the time difference between packets sent and 
received was recorded, dividing the total time 
difference over the total number of CBR packets 
received gave the average end-to-end delay for the 
received packets. Lower the end to end delay better 
is the performance of the protocol.
 

 
Packet Loss
 
: It is defined as the difference between 
the number of packets sent by the source and 
received by the sink. In our results we have 
calculated packet loss at network layer as well as 
MAC layer. The routing protocol forwards the packet 
to destination if a valid route is known; otherwise it is 
buffered until a route is available. There are two 
cases when a packet is dropped: the buffer is full 
when the packet needs to be buffered and the time 
exceeds the limit when packet has been buffered. 
Lower is the packet loss better is the performance of 
the protocol.
 
 
Routing Overhead
 
: Routing overhead has been 
calculated at the MAC layer which is defined
 
as the 
ratio of total number of routing packets to data 
packets.
 
Figure 1(a) shows the Packet Delivery Ratio 
(PDR) for basic P2P, AGKTP[32] and HTAGKTP. Based 
on these results it is evident that HTAGKTP recovers 
most of the PDR loss that observed in AGKTP[32] 
against to basic P2P . The approximate PDR loss 
recovered by HTAGKTP over AGKTP[32] is 1.5%, which 
is an average of all pauses. The minimum individual 
recovery observed is 0.18% and maximum is 2.5%. 
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peers iOP for 1,...,| |i OP , on ( )f x iP able to 
compute the polynomial ( )f x and recover the group 
key and then iP computes hash value from k and 
iOP for 1,2,3,.... 'i t then compares with auth for 
validity.
Figure 1(b) indicates AGKTP[32] advantage over 
A
pr
il
HTAGKTP in Path optimality.  HTAGKTP used average 
0.019 hops longer than in AGKTP[32] because of the 
hop level certification validation process of the 
HTAGKTP that eliminates nodes with invalidate 
certificate. Here slight advantage of AGKTP[32] over 
HTAGKTP can
 
be observable. 
 
The packet delivery fraction (PDF) can be expressed as:
 
1
'
1
* '
e
f
f f
R
P
N
P P
c




 
 P  is the fraction of successfully delivered packets,  
 c  is the total number of flow or connections,  
 f  is the unique flow id serving as index,  
 
fR  is the count of packets received from flow f  
 
fN  is the count of packets transmitted to flow f . 
Figure 1(c) confirms that HTAGKTP is having 
fewer packets overhead over AGKTP[32]. Due to stable 
paths with no compromised or victimized nodes 
determined by HTAGKTP this advantage become 
possible. The Packet overhead observed in AGKTP[32] 
is average 5.29% more than packet overhead observed 
in HTAGKTP. The minimum and maximum packet 
overhead in AGKTP[32] over HTAGKTP observed is 
3.61% and 7.29% respectively. 
MAC load overhead is slightly more in 
HTAGKTP over AGKTP[32]. We can observe this in 
Figure 1(d), which is because of additional control 
packet exchange in HTAGKTP for neighbour hop 
validation through certificate exchange.  The average 
MAC load overhead in HTAGKTP over AGKTP[32] 
1.64%. The minimum and maximum MAC load overhead 
observed is 0.81 and 3.24% respectively. 
In all these evaluation strategies the results 
derived for basic P2P are interesting. In all metrics 
except path optimality, basic P2P performed well since it 
is not considering any security issue as routing 
parameter, and it is delivering better QOS under no 
security threat in routing assumption, which is not true in 
real time practices. In path optimality validation among 
three considered protocols basic P2P stands last 
because it is not considering any security constraints, 
hence identifies unstable paths. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Tight security mechanisms are needed to allow 
secure communication among the group members. 
Thus, a communication session must have security 
services to provide authentication, integrity, and 
confidentiality. Group Key (GK) is the primary and key 
part of the safe group communication. The performance 
of GK generation process, which is required for secure 
communication, may degrade due to less performing 
members. Thus, the generation process must be done 
is a more precise way but filtering less performing 
members. Many changes are occurring in the recent 
years as increase in usage of mobile computers, 
network clusters communication with standard servers. 
Apart from this, heterogeneity and distributed computer 
environment became common in the current internet 
world. Thus, GK management system must consider 
various parameters, differences and environments 
involved in the communication.  These considerations 
as the basis, the effectiveness of HTAGKTP protocol in 
comparison to AGKTP[32] is proved. This protocol 
improves the efficiency by considering the parameters 
effecting the performance i.e. computational delay and 
network latency. Thus, this research is aimed at and 
thus proved that GKGP is more efficient and maximizes 
the applicability of communication. 
 
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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(a) Packet delivery ratio comparison using line chart 
 
 
(b) Bar chart representation of Path optimality 
 
 
(c) A line chart representation of Packet overhead 
comparison report 
 
(d)  Mac load comparison represented in bar chart 
format 
 
Figure 1: Evaluation report of HTAGKTP performance over AGKTP[32] 
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